'It's a trap!' : Procedural pitfalls

The court of appeals recently told a pro se worker that rules were rules and it was too bad that the Division sometimes seemed inappropriately rigid in a system what wasn’t supposed to get too hung up on technical rules.  Burchfield v Renard Paper Co., No. ED 99151 (Mo App. July 16, 2013), 2013 MO App. Lexis 837.

The Commission insists on proper procedure, at least, most of the time.

Depositions which contain a request for production of videos produces an ongoing duty to supplement evidence based on Rule 56.01(e), even in the absence of a separate subpoena duces tecum.   Burlison v Dept. of Public Safety, 2015 MO WCLR Lexis 10 (Feb. 6, 2015).   The employer indicated it had no duty to provide video obtained after the deposition because there was never a subpoena served nor any duty to supplement.  The ALJ found Rule 56.01(e) set forth a duty to seasonably amend a prior response to a request or production and excluded the video. As the employer did not produce video acquired after the deposition the ALJ barred use of two days of surveillance to defend a PTD claim from a person who stated she could not use her arm. 

The Commission insisted on a proper foundation to admit a deposition.  Walker v Bon Appetit Management, 2013 Mo WCLR Lexis 165 (August 29, 2013)

A deposition was properly excluded from evidence based on Rule 57.05 when deposition in Missouri taken by out of state notary public.  Lewis v City of Liberty, 600 S.W.2d 677 (MO App. 1980).  It was the employee's deposition and no one had appeared rom the employer and the court notes there were "vague and inconclusive charges and countercharges" between "counsel on both sides relative to whether the noticed deposition had been cancelled."

Medical records addressing pre-existing conditions were not newly discovered records and could not be submitted on appeal before the commission when the pro se claimant could have submitted the 650 pages of records at the hearing for PTD.  Hilderbrand v Fry Wagner Industrial  Moving, 2014 MO WCLR Lexis 108 (Sept. 5, 2014) (denying benefits).

The failure to make a timely offer of proof did not preserve error concerning the admission of exhibits which were not certified.  Calvert v Treasurer of the State of Mo., 2013 Mo. App. Lexis 1429 (Nov. 27, 2013) ("This Court assumes the absence of a reference to the exhibits in its Final Award Allowing Compensation was a de facto exclusion of those exhibits by the Commission.... Claimant's attempt to make an offer of proof by filing an "Offer of Proof as to Exhibits M, M, P, Q, R and T" with the Commission fails to preserve the issue for appeal.")

The failure to file a timely answer resulted in the alleged rate of maximum benefits whether that representation of earnings is accurate or not.  T.H. v. Sonic Drive In of High Ridge, 2012 Mo App Lexis 1585 (December 18, 2012); 2012 Mo WCLR Lexis 102, DOLIR 3-1-2013.   On the other hand, an allegation of a specific amount of disability on a claim form doesn’t work the same way.  Taylor v Labor Pros, 392 S.W.3d 39 (January 8, 2013).

The commission excluded a vocational report as hearsay when attached to the opinion of a medical expert.  Smith v Roberts Dairy, 2014 MO WCLR Lexis 81 (June 13, 2014).  The commission rejection an offer of a medical report which was attached to the brief and "inadvertently" excluded from the transcript.  "For obvious reasons, this purported report does not constitute evidence, nor can we consider it now."  Wagner v City of Maryland Heights, 2014 Mo WCLR Lexis 84. 

The Commission enhanced an award for medical bills, rejecting a defense based on an affidavit that claimant no longer had liability for the repriced bills.  Maness v City of Desoto, 2013 Mo WCLR Lexis 184 (5-24-2013). The Commission reversed an award of nearly $53,000 in medical bills because the affidavits to the bills were incomplete, unsigned, contained unexplained redactions or were inconsistent with the page numbers of the exhibits. Bartels v McDonald, 2013 Mo WCLR Lexis 61 (3-27-2013).

The commission precluded an  employer from amending an answer to deny accident an hour after the hearing in a temporary award started.  The ALJ found the employer was bound by its earlier admission, and that additional facts supported the finding of accident.   Morris v Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 2013 MO WCLR Lexis 159 (August 22, 2013).

The Commission allowed  sanctions for denying benefits without proper explanation.  It is a paradigm of ‘show your work.’  Nouraie v Mo Baptist Hospital, DOLIR  2013 Mo WCLR Lexis 52 (3-13-2013).  The commission suggested the adjustor misinterpreted medical records as a basis to deny the claim. “We think employer's act of denying workers' compensation benefits to employee before even discussing the alleged injury with employee constituted an egregious offense.”

The ALJ rejected a 7 day rule objection based on new medical opinions about causation find that the rule did not apply to issues of causation.  Greer v Sysco Food, 2014 Mo WCLR Lexis 3-28-2014.  The expert conceded he never used the statutory language of prevailing factor in any of his reports.

In an unemployment case, an issue arose whether an appeal was filed by the correct business entity when there were two entities involved including the company (Joplin Stone)  and the parent company (Springfield Underground).   A HR manager for Springfield filed the appeal.  Claimant testified that the same manager worked for Joplin Stone.   Rule 5.29 allows appeals by an officer in managerial capacity of the business entity.    The court of appeals affirmed the Commission's objection to the Division's argument that the appeal lacked standing because the wrong entity filed an application and such a appeal constituted unauthorized practice of law.  The court of appeals rejected the Division of Employment Security's appeal for the same reason the Division objected to the appeal:  lack of standing.   There was no statutory basis for the Division to appeal its argument because issues about unauthorized practice should be pursued elsewhere and there was no standing as an "aggrieved" party under 288.210  for the Division itself to raise the party in this appeal.  In re Howard v Joplin Stone, SD 33251 (Sept. 24, 2014). 

In a tort case, an issue arose whether survivors could recover pre-judgment interest on a $15,000,000 bench verdict when the defendant admitted he drove recklessly causing a roll-over resulting in a fatality.  The prejudgment interest statute of 408.040 has specific procedural requirements and any demands must include  "for wrongful death, personal injury, and bodily injury claims, be accompanied by a list of the names and addresses of medical providers who have provided treatment to the claimant or decedent for such injuries, copies of all reasonably available medical bills, a list of employers if the claimant is seeking damages for loss of wages or earnings, and written authorizations sufficient to allow the party, its representatives, and liability insurer if known to the claimant to obtain records from all employers and medical care providers...."
The court noted the failure to provide the requisite releases precluded a claim for prejudgment interest based on legislative intent even if there was no prejudice.
Hawley v Tseona, WD 76358 (Mo. App. 2014).  (Nov. 25, 2014).  Interestingly, the Mo comp statute has no similar requirements for disclosure. 



 




 

Commission finds no remarriage penalty for PTD cases

The cost of remarriage is getting a lot of attention in Missouri comp lately.

In the normal course of events, a surviving spouse who decides to remarry loses ongoing benefits but can receive a lump sum.   That's section 287.240, for those keeping score.

The court of appeals recently decided how much remarriage costs a surviving spouse. It concluded that  statute  actually involved two different types of benefits for remarriage and survivor benefits, and  decided the surviving spouse could receive the higher rate as a two-year survivor benefit because it found different methods of calculating compensation rate for each type of benefit.    Ash v Millennium Restoration and Construction, SD 32381 (Mo.. App. August 27, 2013); 2013 Mo App. Lexis 1005,

In a new 2-1 Commission case,  Shelton v Titan Plastics Group, 2013 MO WCLR Lexis 201 (Oct. 10, 2013), the Commission charts bold territory and decided in cases pending before June 26, 2008 a spouse who remarries doesn't lose any lifetime benefits at all.  How can this be?   The Commission decides the 287.240  doesn't apply at all the surviving spouses receiving benefits under Schoemehl because benefits paid after a death of a claimant just aren't death benefits.

The commission  affirmed  PTD benefits against the Fund.  The Fund offers no medical evidence to defend its defense against PTD and argues on appeal the Commission should ignore the Supreme Court.  The ALJ adopts the disability opinions of claimant's expert.  The case arises from a 2003 accident in Butler County when the claimant had orthopedic injuries after he was injured by a forklift truck.  He died nearly 9 years later before a hearing and was awarded permanent partial disability benefits against the employer and permanent total disability against the second injury fund. 

Here's Schoemehl 101 :  "In Schoemehl v Treasurer of State, 217 S.W.3d 900 (Mo. 2007),  the Court stated, Section 287.240.4, which applies to the entire workers' compensation chapter, states that "[t]he word 'dependent' as used in this chapter shall be construed to mean a relative by blood or marriage of a deceased employee, who is actually dependent for support, whole or part, upon his or her wages at the time of the injury." Emphasis added. As such, any "dependent" would have to be born and dependent at the time of the injury.  The holding in Schoemehl was subsequently abrogated with the passage  of Mo. Rev. Stat. 287.230.2,, which was effective June 26, 2008."

The  case is a clear provocation to appeal and force the appellate court to directly address  issue raised in White v Univ of Mo.,  375 S.W.3d 908 (Mo. App. 2012) suggesting that remarriage divests any entitlement to ongoing benefits. The majority of the Commission suggested that the court of appeals really didn't mean it and it was all dicta. 

A dissenting commissioner argued that Schoemehl decision provided a lamentable windfall  and that the majority's interpretation to ignore the remarriage penalty was wrong.  "If it is proper to use the favorable portions of the "dependent" definition to trigger the substitution of the dependent as the "employee" entitled to permanent total disability benefits, then it is equally proper to use the unfavorable portions of the definition to trigger the point at which the substitution and benefits end."
 Shelton is more important as a reflection of  trends of Missouri's new commissioner than for its general application as the decision which arguably matters only to workers that have had cases dragging on before June 2008.   The fact that this case lingered more than 10 years before reaching any hearing is a clear warning just how many cases may be lurking in the shadows.  

ALJ Strange
Atty:  Little

SIF defense fails based on inconsistent medical history

The Commission affirms an award of permanent total disability against the Second Injury Fund for a 66-year old corrections officer who alleges her right knee popped when she twisted suddenly after she heard a loud noise descending steps.  Simon v St. Louis County, 2013 MO WCLR Lexis 202 (Oct 11, 2013). 

Claimant asserts the accident tore her meniscus and made her chondromalacia symptomatic.
The Commission rejected defenses of causation and considered the SIF's expert documented an incomplete medical history which did not fully describe a twisting episode.  The defense was "undermined by his [Dr. Nogalski's]  failure (for whatever reason) to obtain and/or to record an accurate history of injury."  Claimant had treatment  involving the leg knee and prior right leg issues related to a heart condition.  The SIF did not dispute the occurrence of an accident.  The employer settled the case prior to the hearing. 

ALJ:  Lane
Atty:  Kendrick, Hudson
Experts:  Volarich, Nogalski

SIF recovery fizzles from accident during a failed attempt to return to work

The typical SIF case involves recoveries where a pre-existing permanent partial disability combines with a work-related permanent partial disability to cause permanent total disability.   227.220.1  What if the claimant is not "really" working in the open labor market at the time of the primary injury and  he doesn't have a prior permanent partial disability but a prior permanent total disability?  Hembree v Jerry Bennett Masonry, 2013 MO WCLR Lexis 199 (October, 3, 2013) deals just with that problem.    One can be working full-time but still deemed unable to work for purposes of being totally disabled under the Missouri comp statute.

In this case Mr. Hembree, a former bricklayer,  went back to work after a major 2006 accident as a tuck pointer and as a clean up man. He went back in work in January 2007 and continued until October 2008 about the time he developed a cyst on his non-dominant left hand.  Contrary to claimant's own position, the commission finds for 1 1/2 years he engaged in a failed return to work and he really wasn't working after all in the open labor market.     Since claimant was already totally disabled at the time of his October 2008 claim he couldn't access the second injury fund because he didn't have prior partial disability.  As a result, the Commission reversed an award of life-time benefits to the 61-year old claimant  against the fund.

Claimant's experts  revised their opinions to support a claim that the 2008 un-operated ganglion cyst combined with prior conditions to render claimant totally disabled, even though their earlier opinions attributed total disability to an 2006 accident.  Claimant had settled with the employer for both the 2006 and 2008 accidents. What is unclear from the opinion is whether or not claimant had a second injury fund recovery also in the 2006 accident based on allegations of total disability. That would make the decision of the Commission even clearer if claimant had already had one bite at the SIF apple. 

The court of appeals affirmed the decision on July 2, 2014 MO Lexis App. 747,and rejected the assertion that the denial  cannot be based on a credibility determination when the claimant offers a vocational expert and the SIF offers no expert. "the SIF was under no obligation to produce any evidence whatsoever regarding Claimant's workers' compensation claim, including any vocational expert testimony. Claimant cites us to no relevant legal authority holding otherwise." The commission was free to disbelieve  "self-serving testimony regarding the type and intensity of his employment following the 2006 Injury."

ALJ Wilson
Experts:  Koprivica, Lala

Other working total cases:


 In Scott v Treasurer of the State of Missouri, No. WD 76602 (Jan 14, 2014), 2014 MO App. Lexis 32, the Commission  denied benefits for a claim against the second injury fund on the defense that claimant was already a "working" total and not really working when he was hurt at work so he failed to prove his liability against the Fund from a combination of primary and prior impairments.  The proof of PTD is that in the ordinary course of business, no employer reasonably would be expected to hire the injured worker, given his present physical condition.  The court reversed the denial of Fund benefits.

Claimant operated heavy equipment and performed excavation and incorporated his business.  His brother, "wives" or other employees handled the paperwork.  Claimant stopped working in 2009 after a shoulder injury, after having sustained multiple previous injuries.  The court found that the Commission mischaracterized the record that claimant resumed only limited duties following a 2001 accident when he had broader activities of lifting, loading, and vehicle maintenance duties and that he would operate pieces of heavy equipment for as much as eight to twelve hours a day and the finding that claimant was told to stop working was not supported by evidence that claimant may have been to stop working so fast.  The court also noted that vocational testimony that claimant could not find work in the open labor market because of a need to change posture every 1-2 hours based its restrictions on limitations which arose after the primary injury.

The Scott decision is simple, in some respects.  The Commission didn't make findings consistent with the record.  Try again. 

 Claimant needs to prove for Fund liability prior hindrances or obstacles to his employment but not conditions that were so disabling that there was no combination with the primary injury.  Claimant introduced evidence of various prior conditions.  The vocational expert indicated that claimant
 is highly-accommodated and can't be considered really working because no reasonable employer would accommodate  him as much as when he acts as his own boss.  The court essentially noted that claimant is performing duties typical of his profession and hours typical of his profession and that self-accommodation arose after the last accident.

The better test to determine whether claimant is "really" working needs to depart from the fiction of what a "reasonable" employer would do and return to reality, as the court did in this case, to look at claimant's capacity to perform jobs and the type of schedule claimant worked.     There are  21 million self-employed businesses in this country and more than 237,000 micro business in Missouri with fewer than 10 employees.   A smaller business or self-employment by its nature may provide greater freedom and accommodation which might not be available in a bigger business.  The fact that there may be accommodation available in this setting misapplies the statute.   The suggestion by vocational testimony in so many cases  that running a small business is not really working in the open labor market may be to a shock to hard-working small business owners in Missouri.

In Scott v Scott Excavating, 2014 MO WCLR Lexis 73 (June 10, 2014) the Commission found PPD benefits from the second injury fund and that the primary accident combined synergistically with prior conditions, contrary to the opinion of the ALJ that claimant was not employed in the open labor market because he accommodated his performance through self-employment. 

A claimant who is working but not "really" working cannot have a new claim of disability if he is already disabled, according to a recent Missouri decision.  Archer v City of Cameron, 2014 Mo WCLR Lexis 15, and 2014 Mo WCLR Lexis 16 (Jan 30, 2014).

Archer hurt his back on two occasions while working for City of Cameron.  In 2008 he was driving a skid loader,  struck a manhole, and he hurt his spine.  He returned to  work  with 25-50 pound restrictions for another 2 years performing labor with the help of co-workers.   Claimant worked until 2010 when he had another accident to his back bending over and was placed on 5 pound lifting restrictions while treating for an acute  strain.

The ALJ concluded claimant reported increased symptoms after 2010 so he had a new 7 1/2% permanent disability  contrary to medical opinions.  The ALJ awarded  partial disability in the 2008 and 2010 accidents against the employer and   total disability against the second injury fund from the 2010 accident.

The Commission  reversed the award of  liability in the 2010 case against the employer and the second injury fund.  It relied upon medical opinion that claimant was totally disabled as a result of the 2008 accident  and shifts liability for a total from the financially challenged second injury fund to the employer.  It  found that the ALJ erred finding claimant employable in the open labor market in 2010  contrary to medical opinions that the 2008 accident rendered him totally disabled because claimant had gone back to work for 2 years.  The Commission concluded "We find that during employee's return to work, employee was not performing the usual duties of his employment in the manner that such duties are customarily performed by the average person engaged in such work. Consequently, employee's return to work did not constitute proof that employee could compete for work in the open labor market."  The Commission concludes that the degree of claimant's accommodation (taking breaks, obtaining help, missing days) would not be available to any other applicant in the open labor market in an arms length transaction.

 The Commission reached a similar conclusion in  Ives v Triple Crown Services, 102 Mo WCLR Lexis 26 (December 28, 2012) found a claimant who returned to work for 6 years wasn't really working and disregarded opinions of the ALJ that claimant worked in the open labor market.

  This case demonstrates a stronger exercise of the de novo powers by the Commission. Whether claimant is working or not "really" working based on the level of accommodation is a critical issue. The party facing a claim of total disability  ignores this issue at its peril.    The case  demonstrates the easy burden to show a return to work is a 'failed' return to work even in an economy where most people don't remain employed by the same business for life.  Employers who bring an injured worker back to work may received benefits of their experience but the benefit of returning an injured worker as a shield to a PTD claim may be a very weak one with the current Commission. 

 ALJ Mieners
Atty:  Stracke, Kupin, Wiles
Experts: Stuckmeyer, Wheeler, Dreiling, England
Treater:  Middleton


**
A claimant who is working but is highly accommodated is still "working" based in part on her ability to maintain a full-time schedule. In Breese v SBC, 2014 MO App. Lexis 19 (Feb. 14, 2014) the Commission rejected  a SIF defense that claimant was already a working total before her bilateral carpal tunnel.  Claimant performed data entry but had impaired mobility, she required the use of a scooter, a handicap-equipped van, and required accommodation from co-workers who would file papers, fax items and provide other assistance.  Vocational experts provided conflicting testimony whether claimant's high level of accommodation prior the carpal tunnel condition allowed her to compete in the open labor market.  The ALJ found significant that claimant maintained a full-time schedule before the accident. Claimant's hand weakness after the accident required more assistance to help unloading her scooter.  The ALJ rejected the SIF defense of post-accident worsening based on lack of any medical evidence to support the position. 
ALJ Carlisle
Atty:  Moreland
Experts:  Musich, Wiemholt, England

**
In a new case, the commission had to decide whether running for local office was equivalent to working in the open labor market when it involved "door to door campaigning, attending parades, attending picnics, attending rallies, putting up a booth and walking and handing out literature.  [and at]picnics he walked around and talked to everyone he could." Robertson v D&S Enterprises, 2014 Mo WCLR Lexis 14 (Jan 23, 2014). 

The Commission concluded that campaigning  was not evidence that claimant was employable.  The commission agreed that  67 year old claimant was entitled to permanent partial  SIF benefits based in part on multiple prior comp settlements but he failed to establish that his current state of disablement flowed from a combination of a primary 2000 accident and pre-existing conditions.    The Commission concluded any PTD claim against the fund was undermined in part due to post-accident worsening of various conditions during the 12 years the case was pending between accident and the hearing.  

A dissent would have awarded total benefits to the claimant and indicated there was insufficient medical evidence to establish post-accident worsening.

The ALJ noted claimant's political activities running for County Commissioner 4 years after his accident were inconsistent with his level of reported symptoms.  He  found his medical experts less persuasive based on exams performed about  five years after the accident.

ALJ Robbins
Atty:  Morgan, Lintner

**

The Commission rejected the SIF defense that claimant was a "working total" and it had no liability.  Stewart v Subway, 2013 Mo WCLR Lexis 89 (June 14, 2013).

The claimant had sporadic employment for 12 years leading up to her 2009 accident. She had worked only 29 months out of 144 months and was on social security.   She made sandwiches for about 20 hours a week.  She fell in February 2009  on some water, had surgery for a SLAP tear, and was released without restrictions.  The ALJ concluded claimant sustained 20% new disability and concluded she was employed in the open labor market at the time of her accident, even though she was  working part-time.  Essentially she found her previous jobs were "real" and not "make-work" positions, noting they were real jobs defined by the DOT.

The Commission found the Second Injury Fund was available to people who had seriously limiting chronic conditions who worked part-time. The dissent argued that if claimant would be PTD with the same limitations after an accident, the same limitations should disqualify her from accessing the Fund even though claimant may have been tenacious or fortuitous enough to "eke out" a job on occasion.

The court of appeals affirmed, 2014 MO App Lexis 17 (Feb. 10, 2014).  It deferred to the Commission and noted reasonable minds could differ whether claimant was totally disabled before the last accident.  The issue was whether claimant could compete in the open labor market and claimant had competed to obtain jobs (answering job ads, filling applications) and maintained employment (part-time) despite substantial work absences from chronic serious medical conditions. 

 ALJ  Mahon
Atty:  Alberhasty


In Kist v Mo Lime Co., 2013 Mo WCLR Lexis 225 (December 12, 2013) the Commission essentially concluded that claimant was a working total and  affirmed a denial of benefits against the second injury fund for a 2000 accident when it already concluded claimant was already totally disabled from a 1999 accident.   Claimant had prior back discomfort that required pain management and changes in his job activities leading up to a 1999 accident when his vehicle hit a rock and he reinjured his back and then underwent additional spinal surgeries which failed to resolve intractable pain.   The second injury fund's own expert concluded claimant was unemployable in the open labor market.  Claimant had returned to work only briefly leading up to a 2000 accident when his expert alleged "shaking" ultimately caused the need for a disputed cervical fusion. 

ALJ  Robbins
Atty:  Moreland
Treaters:  Mirkin, Weatherington
Experts:  Musich, Bernardi, Robson