White v Conagra Packaged Foods
2017 MO 585 (Dec. 19, 2017)
The Supreme Court affirms a denial of benefits in a death case in which a machinist with multiple cardiac risk factors died at work after working in a hot environment.
The ALJ and Commission denied benefits based on conflicting medical opinion about the cause of death.
" In the supplemental opinion, the Commission first determined White suffered an accident because White's "death at work was an unexpected traumatic event." Second, the Commission addressed the issue of medical causation. In doing so, the Commission answered the question of whether "work was the prevailing factor in causing the alleged accident." After weighing the expert testimony, the Commission concluded Claimant had not met her burden of establishing medical causation. The Commission relied on Dr. Farrar's testimony in concluding White's work activities were not the prevailing factor in causing his cardiovascular event. The Commission was not persuaded by Dr. Schuman's testimony because the Commission found he "did not possess the necessary factual foundation to support his theory,"
The court noted the correct standard in cardiac cases is a special section and not the general accident rubric:
"Even though the Commission failed to identify accurately the "accident" (i.e., the unusual strain on White due to the extraordinary heat) and the "injury" (i.e., death resulting from ischemia-induced arrhythmia), it accurately identified the key issue in this case, i.e., whether the accident was the prevailing factor in causing the injury."
"Section 287.020.3(4) provides that a death or other condition resulting from a cardiovascular event" suffered by a worker is an injury only if the accident is the prevailing factor in causing the resulting medical condition." § 287.020.3(4) (emphasis added). Accordingly, such cases are not exempt from the ordinary accident/injury rubric set forth in section 287.120.1, and section 287.020.3 addresses how that rubric is to apply in these special circumstances
The court found the decision properly imposed a burden of proof based on prevailing factor rather than a preponderance of the evidence and the commission could properly reject lay testimony to the extent that it tried to establish the length of exposure became sufficient to support a causation opinion in a complex medical issue.
